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Abstract
In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp de-
creases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, and at least until
the end of 2007, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much
milder movements in output and inflation. Using a structural VAR approach Blan-
chard and Gali (2007a) argued that this has reflected in large part a change in
the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. In order to shed
light on the possible factors behind the decrease in the macroeconomic effects of oil
price shocks, we develop a new-Keynesian model, with imported oil used both in
production and consumption, and we use a minimum distance estimator that min-
imizes, over the set of structural parameters and for each of the two samples (pre
and post 1984), the distance between the empirical SVAR-based impulse response
functions and those implied by the model. Our results point to two relevant changes
in the structure of the economy, which have modified the transmission mechanism
of the oil shock: vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of
monetary policy. The relative importance of these two structural changes depends
however on how we formalize the process of expectations formation by economic
agents.
*We thank Efrem Castelnuovo, Giuseppe Ciccarone, Carlo Favero, Jordi Gali, Stefano Giglio, Tom-
maso Monacelli, Luca Sala and Massimiliano Tancioni for helpful comments and suggestions.
tMIT, NBER, and IMF.
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Introduction
In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in
output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, and at least until the end of 2007,
even larger increases in the price of oil have been associated with much milder movements
in output and inflation^ Our goal in this paper is to look at the changes in the causal
relation from the price of oil to output and inflation in order to learn about the nature of
the changes occurred in the structure of the economy.
Using a structural VAR approach, Blanchard and Gali (2007a) (BG in what follows)
estimated impulse response functions (IRFs) for the United States, both for the pre- 1984
and the post-1984 periods, and concluded that the post-1984 effects of the price of oil on
either output or the price level were roughly equal to one-third of those for the pre-1984
period.
They then explored informally the potential role of three factors in accounting for the
change: a smaller share of oil in production and consumption, lower real wage rigidity, and
better monetary policy. Using a calibrated new-Keynesian model, they concluded that,
in combination, these factors could potentially explain the change. They did not however
estimate the model, nor —except for documenting the decrease in the share of oil in
production and consumption— did they estimate the change in the relevant parameters.
This is the natural next step, and this is what we do in this paper.
We write down a new-Keynesian model, with imported oil used both in production
and consumption and we then use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes, over
the set of structural parameters and for each of the two samples, the distance between
the empirical IRFs obtained by BG and those implied by the model. We reach two main
conclusions.
First, from a substantive point of view, our results indicate two relevant changes in
the structure of the economy which could have modified the transmission mechanism
of the oil shocks: vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of
monetary policy. The identification of the relative importance of these two structural
changes turns out to depend however on how we formalize the process of expectations
formation by agents. To capture the degree of anchoring of expectations, we use two
specifications, each of which strikes us as equally plausible. When inflation expectations
are partly affected by the current level of inflation, much of the difference between the
two samples is attributed to changes occurred in the labor market and it can be traced
to a large decline in real wage rigidity, with a smaller role attributable to more effective
monetary policy. Conversely, when households and firms partly base their expectations on
lagged inflation the driving force behind the changes between the two periods is a more
effective anchoring of inflation expectations, which we interpret as an improvement in
monetary policy credibility, with a smaller role for more flexible real wages. Under both
specifications we find evidence of a slightly stronger interest rate reaction to expected
'While the large increase in the price of oil in 2008 may have played a role in the current crisis, it is
clear that the sharp drop in output since then is due primarily to factors other than oil. Using data for
2008 would give an undue large role to the price of oil in decreasing output. For this reason, we have
ended our sample at the end of 2007.
inflation and of a decrease in nominal price rigidity over the post-1984 period, a factor
not emphasized by BG. While the second formalization yields a slightly lower value for
the distance function, we find however that the difference between the two specifications
is not statistically significant.
Second, from a methodological point of view, our paper sheds light on the pros and
cons of impulse response matching as a strategy of estimating model parameters. On the
one hand, the advantage of identifying the parameters of the model from the IRFs to oil
shock is that this shock is observable and can be directly and clearly identified in the
data. Hence, we trust the IRFs we ask the model to match. On the other hand, this
particular shock only sheds light on some of the parameters, while being less informative
about some others, and the fitting of only the set of IRFs related to oil shock does not
help to disentangle between the relative role played by vanishing wage indexation and the
role played by the improvement in the credibility of monetary policy.
Extending the minimum distance estimation to other well identified shocks, for which
the two forces make a substantial difference, could help to disentangle their relative impor-
tance. The natural candidates to look at are well identified demand side shocks. However,
the empirical investigation extended to demand side shocks lies beyond the scope of the
present paper and we leave it for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 shows the IRFs from BG. Section 2
presents the model. Section 3 discusses the results of estimation of the two benchmark
specifications. Section 4 explores a number of extensions of the basic model. Section 5
concludes. .
1 Impulse responses
Figure 1 reproduces the impulse responses froni BG which we shall try to fit with the
structural model. These are obtained from estimation of two structural VAR in six vari-
ables, GDP, employment, the wage, the GDP deflator, the CPI, the nominal price of
oil, all in rates in change. Both VARs are estimated using quarterly data, the first over
the sample 1970:1-1983:4, the second over the sample 1984:1-2007:3. The identifying as-
sumption is that innovations to the price of oil within the quarter are not affected by
innovations to the other variables. '
,
The IRFs are shown for the first twenty quarters. The centered lines in each figure
give the estimated impulse responses of each variable, in level, to a positive shock to a
price of oil of 10%. The upper and lower hues give one-standard deviation bands, obtained
through Monte Carlo simulations. In all cases, the real price of oil shows a near-random
walk response (not shown here), i.e. it jumps on impact, and then stays around a new
plateau.
For our purposes, the IRFs in the figure have five major characteristics:
• Slowly building effects on activity and price variables in the two samples.
• Long lasting effects on all variables in the two samples.
• A smaller effect on GDP and employment in the second than in the first sample
(roughly 1/3).
• A smaller effect on the GDP deflator and CPI in the second than in the first sample
(roughly 1/3).
• No significant effect on nominal wages in the second sample, compared to a strong
and significant effect in the first sample.
2 A model
To interpret these IRFs and recover structural parameters, we develop a new-Keynesian
model. The model is standard, except for four extensions, each needed for our purposes.
• We allow for the use of oil as an input in both production and consumption. We
assume that the country is an oil importer, and take the real price of oil (in terms
of domestic goods) as exogenous.
• We allow for habit formation in consumption. This is done in order to capture the
first characteristic of the data listed in the previous section, namely the slow adjust-
ment of output and employment over time. In the model, output is determined by
demand, and equal to consumption, and habit formation leads to a slow adjustment
of consumption.
• We aJlow for real wage rigidity, one of the potential factors emphasized by BG.
We formalize it as a slow adjustment of the real wage at which workers are willing
to work to their marginal rate of substitution. That real wage rigidity may have
decreased over time seems plausible, as weakening unions, increasing competition
and declining minimum wage have made the structure of labor compensation much
more flexible in the 2000s than it was in the 1970s.
• To capture the notion of policy credibility, we allow agents' inflation expectations
to depend directly on current or past inflation. The smaller the dependence on cur-
rent or past inflation, the better anchored are inflation expectations, and the more
favorable is the trade-off between inflation and output. That inflation expectations
may have become better anchored over time also strikes us as plausible. BG provide
direct evidence of a decrease in the response of expected inflation to the oil price
shock since the mid-1980s, while the strength of the response of the nominal interest
rate has not changed much across sample periods. Variations in the dynamics of
expectations play a key role in the "good policy" hypothesis of the Great Moder-
ation (Clarida, Gah and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and
Giannoni (2002 and 2006), Castelnuovo and Surico (forthcoming), and Canova and
Gambetti (2009 and forthcoming) for a dissenting view)
The rest of the section presents only the implied log-linearized equations, leaving the
full derivation to the appendix. Lower case letters represent deviations from steady state,
lower case letters with a hat are proportional deviations from steady state.
2.1 Oil in production and in consumption .,'.;
Production is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function in labor and oil:
qt = a„ nj -h am rht (1)
where qt is (gross) domestic product, n^ is labor, fht is the quantity of imported oil used
in production, a„
-I- a„j < 1. Technological progress does not affect the IRF to oil and
can thus be ignored here.
Consumption is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas consumption function in output and
oil:
Ct = {l-\)Cg^ + XC,n,t (2)
where Cj is consumption, c^j is consumption of the domestically produced good, c,n,t is
consumption of imported oil.
In this environment, it is important to distinguish between two prices, the price of
domestic output pg^t and the price of consumption pc,t- Let pni,t be the price of oil, and
s"t = Pm,t—Pq,t be the real price of oil, which is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive
process. From the definition of consumption, the relation between the consumption price
and the domestic output price is given by: .,
,,
Pet ^ Pq,t + \st (3)
The important parameters for our purposes are a^, and x, the share of oil in production
and in consumption.
2.2 Households
The behavior of households is characterized by two equations. The first one characterizes
consumption:
c. = ^c._, + ^^.?.,,-il^(^, -<,,,+ log /3) : (4)
Consumption depends on itself lagged, itself expected, and on the real interest rate in
terms of consumption. The parameter a is the household risk aversion coefficient; together
with /i, it determines the response of consumption to the real interest rate. The parameter
h e [0, 1) captures habit formation (the utility of consumption depends on C — hC{— l),
where C is current consumption, and C(— 1) is lagged aggregate consumption). The higher
the value of /i, the slower the adjustment of the consumption; when h — 0, the relation
reduces to the usual Euler equation.
The second equation characterizes labor supply, or equivalently, the real consumption
wage at which workers are willing to work (the "supply wage" )
:
^t - Pet = 7 i^t-i - Pc,t-i) + (1 - 7) \ <t>nt + YZTJl [^«
~
'^^t-i]
f
(^)
where Wt denotes the nominal wage. The supply wage depends on itself lagged, and on
the marginal rate of substitution. The marginal rate of substitution depends in turn
on employment, with elasticity 0, where cp is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, and on
Ct — /?'Cf_i, with elasticity (t/{1 — h). The parameter 7 G [0,1) captures the extent of
real wage rigidity, which is needed in order to generate a meaningful trade-off between
stabilization of inflation and the welfare relevant output gap (Blanchard and Gall, 2007b).
"V\nien 7 = 0, the supply wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution. The higher
the value of 7, the higher the degree of real wage rigidity.
2.3 Firms
Domestic goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption, and firms are thus monopolistic
competitors. Given the production function, cost minimization implies that the firms'
demand for oil is given by:
m =
-Th -st + qt (6)
where fl^ is the log deviation of the price markup, Mf Using this expression to eliminate
rrit in the production function gives a reduced-form production function:
qi
= {anTit - a,nSt - a,nji^) (7)
1 - a,„
Given employment, output is a decreasing function of the real price of oil.
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Combining the cost minimization conditions for oil and for labor with the aggregate
production function yields the following factor price frontier:
(1 - a„0 {wt - pc,t) + (ttm + (1 - am)x) S( + (1 - a„ - a„,) n^ + 11^^0 (8)
Given productivity, an increase in the real price of oil must lead to one or more of the
following adjustments: (i) a lower consumption wage, (ii) lower employment, (iii) a lower
markup.
This equation defines the real consumption wage consistent with a given markup set
by firms; we can think of it as giving us the "demand wage" as a function of employment.
This will be useful below.
Firms are assumed to set prices a la Calvo (1983), an assumption which yields the
following log-linearized equation for domestic output price inflation (domestic inflation
for short):
T^q.t = PT^lt+1 - K V-t (9)
where Xp = [(1 - 9){1 - /30)/6'][(a,„ + a,0/(l + (1 - a,„ - a„)(e - 1))], 6 denotes the
fraction of firms that leave prices unchanged during a given period, P is the discount
factor of households and e is the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods in
consumption.
2.4 Consumption, output, employment, and GDP
The condition that trade be balanced (as oil is imported) gives us a relation between
consumption and output:
ct = qt - XSt - vTh
__
....
(10)
where 7] = a„j/(7W - a,,,).
Using the reduced-form production function (7) gives a relation between consumption
and employment:
Ci = '^—nt-{\ + -—^^ 'ii+irj--—'^^-)
-jli (11)
1 - "m V 1-Q',„/ V l-ttm/
The characterization of the equilibrium does not require to introduce either value added
or the value added deflator. But these are needed to compare the implications of the
model to the data. .
The value added deflator py^t is implicitly defined by Pq^t = (1 ~ Cim)Py,t + ctm Pm,t-
Rearranging terms gives:
PyJ =Pq,t - St (12)
1 - «m
thus implying a negative effect of the real price of oil on the GDP deflator, given domestic
output prices.
The definition of value added, combined with the demand for oil, yields the following
relation between GDP and gross output:
yt = qt + z St + 1] ^it (13)
1 - a™
2.5 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor rule in which the interest rate responds to
the deviation of expected CPI inflation from a zero target inflation:
i^-logl3 + cfy,{Et7T,^t+i) (14)
In order to analyze to what extent anti-inflation credibility may have played a role for
the decrease in the dynamic effects of oil shocks, we depart from the standard forward
looking inflation expectations for agents other than the central bank, and we explore two
apparently similar, and equally plausible ex-ante specifications. In the first case, we allow
expectations to depend directly on current inflation; in the second, we allow expectations
to depend directly on inflation in the previous quarter. In both cases we interpret the
parameter A G [0, 1] as capturing the quality of monetary policy. The lower A, the less
credible monetary policy, the worse the anchoring of inflation expectations and the worse
the implied trade-off between inflation and output. Both model specifications capture the
idea that, when credibility is low, the central bank is unable to establish an anchor for
inflation expectations, which thus turn out to be strongly connected with actual inflation
dynamics.
i) In the first specification we assume that economic agents form expectations of inflation
according to:
Kt+ l = (1 - ^) ^c,t + XEtTTct+ l ' (15)
^It+l^i'^- >')'^q,t + ^'Ei^q^t+l (16)
ii) In the second specification we assume that economic agents form expectations of
inflation according to:
'c,t+ l [I - X)TTc,t-l + XEtTTc,t+l (17)
^g,«+l = (1 - ^) TTg.i-l + AE(7r,,,+ i (18)
The difference between the two specifications seems minor. Yet, as we shall show, it
gives rise to very different interpretations of the data.
2.6 Equilibrium absent nominal rigidities
Absent nominal rigidities, the firms' markup would be constant, and the evolution of
the economy would be characterized by the condition that the supply wage, implied by
equations (5) and (11), be equal to the demand wage, implied by equation (8) with
iU( = 0. That condition would determine employment and, in turn, output, consumption,
and GDP:
rit = FiSt + r2?t_i + r37if_i (19)
where T, = [a(l-7)-(l-/^)][a^+x(l-a..)1
p _ [(l-/07-g/i(l-7)][am+x(l-Q,n)] p _ y{l-a,n-o'n){l-h)+aha„il—y)
2 — 0(l-7)(l-/i)(l-a,„)+CTa„(l-7)+ (l-/i)(l-a,„-Q„)' 3 — <)i(l-7)(l-h)(l-Q,„)+aa,,(l-7)+ (l-/i.)(l-a.
Two results will be useful for the interpretation of the estimation results to be provided
below.
• The sign of the long run effects of an increase in the price of oil on employment
depends on a. The reason is the same as in the familiar case of technological
progress. A higher price of oil implies a lower real consumption wage, and thus a
decrease in labor supply. It also implies a decrease in consumption, thus a negative
wealth effect, and an increase in labor supply. For cr = 1, the substitution and
wealth effects cancel and employment is constant. If o" < 1, then the substitution
effect dominates, and employment decreases. If ct > 1, then employment increases.
As the model implies that the economy tends to return over time to its equilibrium
absent nominal rigidities, the fact that the IRFs show long lasting effects will tend
to lead to values of a smaller than one.
• The sign of the short run effects of an increase in the price of oil on employment
depends on the sign of (1 — h)/[a{l — 7)] — 1. If, for example, a = 1 so there
is no long run effect, the sign depends on h — 7. The higher the degree of real
wage rigidity, the more likely employment is to decrease in the short run; the higher
the degree of habit formation, the stronger the wealth effect and the more likely
employment is to increase in the short run.
2.7 Equilibrium with nominal rigidities
In the presence of nominal rigidities, aggregate demand (here consumption demand),
equation (4), determines output and employment. The supply wage, given by equations
(5) and (11) and the factor price frontier, equation (8), determine the markup of firms.
The markup then determines inflation, through equation (9).
Monetary policy, given by ecjuation (14), determines the interest rate, and thus affects
consumption, output and employment. If monetary policy maintains a level of employ-
ment equal to that which is obtained absent nominal rigidities, inflation, measured using
the output price, is constant. If it tries to maintain higher employment, then inflation is
higher.
The coefficients associated with nominal rigidities and with monetary policy play the
following role. A lower value of 9 (i.e. lower nominal rigidity) leads to a stronger effect
of a given decrease in the markup on inflation. Thus, for a given policy rule, it leads to a
larger initial increase in inflation and a larger initial decline in output.
A higher value of (p^ leads to a smaller increase in inflation but at the expense of a
larger decrease in output.
Under both specifications for inflation expectations, the lower A, the woi'se the trade-
off between stabilization of quantities and stabilization of prices in response to oil price
shocks. Credibility gains, captured by a higher A, improve the trade-off facing policy-
makers and make it possible to have a smaller impact of a given oil price increase on both
inflation and output.
Furthermore, as shown in figure 2, the shape of the dynamic effects are notably different
across the two model specifications.
'V^Hren we assume that people form their expectations according to equations (15) and
(16), the response of inflation expectations is stronger the lower is A, but its dynamics are
not affected: the largest increase occurs at the start, going subsequently to zero.
On the contrary, when we consider a backward looking behavior according to equations
(17) and (18), not only the magnitude but also the shape of the inflation expectations'
response is affected. In this case, the lower is A, the more hump-shaped the inflation
expectations response.
3 Estimation of the Benchmark
Call X the vector of the 13 parameters of the model. Let ^{X) be the set of impulse
responses of p^^t, Py,t, ^t, Vt and n^ over the first 20 quarters to an increase in the price of
oil implied by X, and let ^ be the estimated IRFs from BG presented in Figure 1. The
minimum distance estimator of A' we use is given by^
X = argmin[$ - *(A')]'D~'[$ - ^(A)] (20)
where 15 is a diagonal matrix, with the sample variances of the ^ along the diagonal (so
that the more tightly estimated IRFs get more weight in estimation).
X is given by A = (a„, a^, /3, x. 4'^ <^) ^i ^i 7i ^; '/"ttj ^j p)- We estimate X separately for
each of the two samples, 1970:1 to 1983:4, and 1984:1 to 2007:3.
Estimating all 13 parameters would be asking too much of the data. Thus, we choose
a number of coefficients a priori:
The coefficients capturing the role of oil in production and in consumption, »„, and
X, can be constructed directly. Following the computations in BG, we choose Q'„j = 1.5%
'^Impulse response matching, as a way of estimating model parameters, has been recently put forward
by Christiano at al (2005).
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and X — 2.3% for the first sample, a^ = 1.2% and x — 1^7% for the second sample. The
way in which these shares affect the outcome is tiirough the expression a^ + (1 — otm)x
(as can be seen by looking at the term in 's in the factor price frontier, (8)). So these
numbers imply that, other things equal, the effect of a given increase in the price of oil in
the second sample is only 3/4 of the effect in first sample.
We assume that, in the short run, firms have enough capital capacity that they operate
under constant returns to labor and oil, so a„ = 1 — Q'^- We calibrate the autoregressive
parameter of the oil shock p = 0.999, in order to have the price of oil being very close
to random walk, as it is in the data, while retaining stationarity to have a determinate
steady state.
With respect to preferences, we assume /5 = 0.99, e = 6.0 (so that the desired markup
of firms over marginal cost is 20%), and a Prisch elasticity cj) — 1.0. Given the long lasting
effects of the price of oil in the IRFs, we do not impose long-run neutrality [a = 1), and
allow for a to be estimated. As both consumption and labor supply decisions depend on
interactions of a and /i, and we let the data determine ct, we do the same for h.
This leaves us with six parameters to be estimated, a and h for preferences, 7 for real
wage rigidity, 6 for nominal price rigidity and (j)^ and A for monetary policy.
3,1 Benchmark parameters
The results of the estimations of the benchmark under specification i and ii are shown in
Table 1 and 2, respectively. The last column gives the minimized value of the distance
function. The implied and actual IRFs under the model specification (i) and under the
model specification (ii) are shown in Figure 3a and 3b respectively'^. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. > ~ - ,' '
Table 1. Benchmark Estimated Parameters
specification (i)
a h 7 9 <l^. A
Distance
F\inction
Pre-1984
0.111
(0.062)
0.971
(0.049)
0.968
(0.125)
0.678
(0.101)
2.887
(1.395)
0.987
(0.289)
115.0314
Post- 1984
0.145
(0.043)
0.898
(0.531)
0.033
(0.056)
0.134
(0.027)
3.785
(1.625)
1.000
(0.593)
65.5805
*Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) have highlighted the role of indeterminate equilibriums in the pre-
1979 period. We pursue an alternative line of explanation here, which does not rely on sunspot fluctuations
in the pre-1984 sample. Thus, in the numerical minimization of (20) we consider only the combinations
of the structural parameters such that the model satifies Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions. Besides,
we impose restrictions on the sign and the magnitude of the parameters which are consistent with their
meaning.
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Table 2. Benchmark Estimated Parameters
specification (ii)
& h 7 ^ ^ 4>. A
Distance
Function
0.100* 0.911 0.284 0.231 2.038 0.103
Pre-1984
(0.002) (0.483) (0.378) (0.154) (0.736) (0.505)
o4.14(5l
Post- 1984
0.152
(0.046)
0.897
(0.029)
0.094
(0.116)
0.126
(0.016)
3.937
(0.479)
0.970
(0.078)
65.2519
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. A star denotes that the estimate reaches the lower
bound imposed in estimation.
For the first sample the minimized value of the distance function under specification
(ii) is somewhat lower than under specification (i). This raises the question of whether
we can reject the first specification relative to the second. However, the distribution of
the distance function is unknowii (as we are not using the efficient weighting matrix, we
cannot use the Hansen's J statistic). In order to compare the measures of goodness of fit
between the two models, we thus use a bootstrap methodology to compute the empirical
probability density function of the statistic given by the difference between the goodness of
fit of the two model specifications'*. The empirical density function is a bell curve centered
at zero. The difference between the goodness of fit of the two model specifications is not
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level: we conclude that the better fit of the
second specification is not significantly better. Thus, in the rest of the paper, we treat
the two specifications in parallel.
Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 2a and 2b then suggest the following conclusions:
• Regardless of the ex ante assumption on the way people form their expectations, the
model provides a good fit of the iixipulse responses in both samples. The implied
IRFs are typically within the one-standard deviation bands. The lower value of the
distance function obtained for the pre-1984 sample under model specification (ii) is
due to an excellent fit of the price and wage dynamics, whereas the larger decrease
in quantities is captured less well by the model.
• While the estimates for the post-1984 sample are remarkably stable across the model
specifications, for the pre-1984 sample there are different sets of parameters that
work nearly equally well across the two equally plausible ex-ante specifications.
Under the model specification (i), the main difference between the two samples is
attributed to a dramatic decline in the degree of real wage rigidity 7, from 0.968 in
*We generate bootstrap residuals by randomly drawing with replacement from the set of estimated
residuals. We construct bootstrap time-series by adding the randomly resampled residuals to the predicted
values and re-estimate the parameters from the fictitious data. On the basis of these parameters, we
compute the statistic of interest.
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•the first sample, to 0.03 in the second. The estimated value of A does not suggest
an important role for the improvement in monetary policy credibility.
Using the terminology often used by central banks, this can be described as strong
"second-round" effects pre-1984, and weak or non existent ones post-1984. Faced
with similar initial increases in the CPI (the "first round" effects), and for given
employment, workers in the 1970s asked for and obtained increases in nominal wages,
which then led to higher prices, confronting the central bank with a worse trade-off
between activity and inflation. In the 2000s, the same initial increases in the CPI
have not led to increases in nominal wages, and thus to further increases in prices.
When people are assumed to form their expectations according to the model speci-
fication (ii), although the estimated value of 7 is still higher in the pre-1984 than in
the post-1984 sample, the crucial role in explaining the different effects of oil price
shocks is played by a strong improvement in the anchoring of inflation expectations,
i.e., by an increase in the estiinated value of A, which we interpret as an increase in
central bank credibility.
In the pre-1984 sample, after the oil shock, the adjustment of inflation expectations
is slow, but increases over time. Conversely, in the post-1984 sample inflation ex-
pectations rise at the start but people anticipate that inflation will decrease later
on. The central bank's inability to anchor expectations, coupled with a milder reac-
tion of the nominal interest rate, makes monetary policy much less effective in the
pre-1984 sample than in the post-1984 one, thus leading to greater macroeconomic
volatility.
The values of a and h are fairly similar across the two samples and across the model
specifications. This is good news, as we would hope preferences to be relatively
stable over time. The low value of a implies a large negative long-run effect of an
increase in the price of oil on employment. -
Under both specifications, the degree of nominal price rigidity 6 is estimated to have
decreased over time. This runs against our (and we would guess, most economists')
priors. First, as inflation has decreased over time, we would expect price setters to
change prices less often. Secondly, a number of recent papers find a fiatter Phillips
curve characterizing the Great Moderation,which would suggest a slower price ad-
justment in the post 1984 period. If indeed present, the lower degree of nominal
price rigidities may come as a consequence of the higher competition experienced in
the last decades, which has probably forced firms to adjust prices more often.
In the pre-1984 sample, model specification (i) is associated with a higher estimated
degree of price stickiness {9 — 0.678) than the model specification (ii) {9 = 0.231).
As a matter of fact, the estimated value of 9 is linked to the estimated value of the
degree of real wage rigidity 7. The reason is as follows. The estimated high degree
of real wage rigidity in the first sample implies a large negative initial effect on the
natural level of employment (the level that would obtain in the absence of nominal
rigidities). Given actual employment and for a given degree of nominal rigidity, this
13
would lead to even more inflation in the first sample than is actually observed in
the data. Tims, the model estimates 0, the degree of nominal rigidity, to be higher
in the first sample than in the second one, especially under the model specification
(i)-
• The weight on expected inflation in the Taylor rule is consistent across specifications,
and it is estimated to be higher in the second sample than in the first one (3.785
versus 2.887 under the first specification, and 3.937 versus 2.037 under the second
specification). This higher weight cannot however, by itself, explain the smaller
effects on both activity and inflation: a stronger anti-inflationary stance can reduce
the volatility of inflation but increase that of GDP.
Our two benchmark estimates point to two relevant changes in the structure of the
economy which have modified the mechanism through which oil price shocks propagate
in the economy: a more fiexible labor market and a more credible monetary policy.
Some findings are consistent across model specifications: a somewhat stronger interest
rate response to variations in expected inflation, a decrease in real wage and nominal
price rigidity (although the magnitude of such decreases is very different across the two
model specifications) and some role attributed to the smaller share of oil in production
and consumption. However, it is hard to identify which of the two structural changes
is the major factor behind the smaller effects of oil price shocks in the 2000s than in
the 1970s. The interpretations of the macroeconomic changes in the effects of oil prices
provided by the two model specifications are very different.
Estimation of the benchmark under the model specification (i) denies a role for the
anchoring of expectations and points to changes in the labor market occurred in term of an
increase of real wage flexibility as the main driving force behind the observed change in the
economy's response to the oil price shock. Conversely, estimation of the benchmark under
the second specification identifies the source of the milder reaction of prices and quantities
in monetary policy, which has become more stabilizing, as a result of a greater effectiveness
in the anchoring of expectations coupled with a stronger interest rate reaction.
The rest of our paper explores the robustness of these conclusions.
4 Extensions
4.1 Alternative estimated IRFs
The benchmark estimated parameters shown in tables 1 and 2 are obtained using an
underlying VAR estimated with variables in rates of change. Estimating everj^hing in first
differences could force long run effects on value added and employment. We thus explore
the effects on the benchmark estimated parameters of an alternative VAR specification,
which uses rates of change for prices and wage and log-deviations from a linear trend for
the quantity variables. Figure 4 reproduces the fRFs obtained from the estimation of the
level/growth specification of the VAR. The results of the structural estimation using such
specification are shown in table 3 for the model specification (i) and in table 4 for the
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model specification (ii). The implied and actual IRFs under the model specifications (i)
and (ii) are shown in figures 5a and 5b.
Table 3. Benchmark Estimated Parameters using the IRFs obtained from
level/gro^vth specification of the VAR
model Specification (i cr h 7 e </-. A
Distance
Function
Pre-1984 0.390 0.909 0.943 0.531 5.000* 1.000 93.8261
Post-1984 0.839 0.461 0.089 0.100* 3.008 1.000 94.9744
Table 4. Benchmark Estimated Parameters using the IRFs obtained from
level/growth specification of the VAR
model Specification (ii) a h 7 e ^. A
Distance
Function
Pre-1984 0.148 0.869 0.376 0.201 2.387 0.162 56.7910
Post- 1984 0.873 0.459 0.204 0.100* 3.387 0.950 94.0661
Notes: A star denotes that the estimate reaches the lower (0) or the upper (0„) bound
imposed in estimation.
The main conclusions are robust to the level/growth specification of the VAR.
When we assume that inflation expectations partly depend on the current level of
inflation, the driving force behind the changes in the macroeconomic effects of oil price
shocks is the dramatic decline in real wage rigidities, coupled with the substantial drop
in price stickiness. Wlien we assume that inflation expectations partly depend on the
lagged level of inflation, much of difference between the two periods can be traced to a
large decline in monetary policy ability to anchor agents expectations.
The estimated parameters mostly affected by the change in the underlying VAR spec-
ification are the risk aversion coefficient a and the degree of habit persistence h. For both
samples and for both formalizations of expectations the estimated value of a is higher and
the estimated value of h is lower under the level/growth specification of the VAR than
under the VAR estimated with all variables in rates of change.
Under the level specification of the VAR the effects of the oil price shock on employ-
ment and value added disappear in the long run, while in the short run they are roughly
equal to those obtained using the growth-specification of the VAR. Since the sign of the
long run effects of an oil price shock on \'alue added and employment depends on a, \'an-
ishing long lasting effects imply an estimated value of a closer to 1. The sign of the short
run effects of an oil price increase depends on [(1 — h)/a[l — 7)] — 1. Having estimated a
higher value for a, the model selects a lower h to keep the short run responses unchanged.
4.2 Leontief technology
The Cobb-Douglas production function assumes unit elasticity between oil and labor,
which surely overestimates this elasticity in the short run. For this reason, we explore a
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Leontief model, where labor and oil are combined in fixed proportions. The production
function is given by:
qt = ut = mt (21)
Consumption is still characterized by the Cobb-Douglas function in output and oil
(2) and the relation between the consumption price and the domestic output price is still
given by equation (3). The Euler equation (4) and the supply wage (5) hence continue to
characterize the behavior of households. Real marginal cost is given by:
mct = Qf„ {wt - pg^t) + a'mS( (22)
As before, we follow the formalism proposed in Calvo (1983), and assume that in each
period a measure (1 — 0) of firms reset their prices. This yields the following equation for
domestic inflation:
^Kt+i +
{i-0)(i-P0)
\^"ith balanced trade the following relation must hold:
mct
Ct Qt- \\
a„
(23)
(24)M - a
The specification of technology implies a relation between value added and gross out
put:
yt = qt
while the value added deflator is given by:
Py,t = m
(25)
(26)
Inflation expectations are still given by (15) and (16) under the model specification
(i) and by (17) and (18) under the model specification ii)
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimated parameters^. Figures 6a and 6b display estimated
and implied IRFs.
Table 5 Est.imated Parameters under Leontief technology. Specificat on (i)
a h 7 s ^. A
Distance
Function
Pre- 1984 0.637 0.870 0.991 0.947 3.113 1.000 133.6951
Post-1984 0.100* 0.937 0.001* 0.662 3.430 1.000 38.5495
'Parameters are estimated using the benchmark VAR.
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Table G Estiinatetl Parani(!tors under Lcdntief t echnology Specification (ii)
O h
-i d 0. A
Distance
Function
Pre- 1984 0.100* 0.919 0.265 0.485 2.037 0.000 72.6659
Post- 1984 0.100* 0.926 0.094 0.737 3.387 0.677 34.9838
Notes: A star denotes that the estimate reaches the lower bound imposed in estimation.
The main conclusions are robust to changes in the specification of technology. The
vanishing real wage rigidities are the driving force behind the change in the effects of oil
shoclvs under the model specification (i). The improvement in the anchoring of expecta-
tions is the major force leading to the decline in macroeconomic volatility after the oil
shock under the model specification (ii).
The degree of price stickiness is however higher in both samples and for both model
specification than under the Cobb Douglas specification. The reason is as follows. Since
there is no substitution of labor for oil in response to the oil price increase, the Leontief
technology produces initial larger effects on both quantities and prices. As lower noiTiinal
rigidity implies larger initial rises in inflation and larger initial drops in output, through a
stronger reaction of inflation to a given decrease in the markup, the Leontief technology
requires more price stickiness to fit the data than the Cobb Douglas technology.
It is worth noting that, taking into account the value attained by the distance function,
in the second sample the model with Leontief Technology outperforms that with Cobb
Douglas technology. In the pre 1984 sample the two models are nearly equivalent in
providing the IRFs matches.
4.3 Variable desired markups
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) have argued that another effect was at work behind
the size of the observed effects of oil price shocks in the 1970s, namely, an endogenous
increase in the firms' markups leading to a larger decrease in output. We capture the
idea that the change in the relevance of the oil price as a source of economic fluctuations
could have been caused by variations in the degree of the countercyclicality of markups by
specifying the desired markup as a function of the real price of oil s. The endogenous rise
in the desired markup significantly increases the predicted effects of an oil price shock on
both quantities and prices. As shown in Appendix b, this assumption modifies domestic
inflation (9) which now contains an additive cost push shock:
7r,,t = /? £'({7r,,t+i} - ApMi + Ap—j-rst (27)
where 0^ G [0, 1) is a measure of the sensitivity of the desired markup to changes in
the real price of oil.
Tables 7 and 8 shows the results of estimation, conditional on different values of (^^
.
Depending on the sample and the specification, the distance function is minimized for
^Parameters are estimated using the benchmark VAR.
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values of (f)^ between 0.05 and 0.2. Allowing the desired markup to be sensitive to the
real price of oil reduces the differences in the conclusions reached under the two model
specifications. The reason is that, under the second model specification, in the pre-1984
sample the higher volatility of both prices and quantities induced by increasing desired
markups is counterbalanced by a less reactive private sector {a, 7 and 9 increase with
the calibrated value of (p^) and by a more credible central bank (A increases with the
cahbrated value oi S^).
Talilc 7. Robustness to introducing variable desired markups. S]>ecifi(;ation (i)
a
Pre-1984 Sample
h 7 e (p^ \ D.F. a
Post- 1984 Sample
h J e <p„ X D.F.
00
or,
10
15
20
2,'-|
30
111 971 0-968 (>7H 2 887
112 966 953 721 2 .537
278 951 959 731 3 2S7
177 934 963 735 3 487
629 935 907 758 -1 087
737 935 968 765 1283
817 939 971 7SI 1573 987
0.987 115.0314
0.837 113889
837
1 000
927
1 000
108 022
105 785
105 016
105 685
1(17 578
0.145 898 0.033 134 3,785
270 878 299 0.224 5.000
440 847 489 369 4 797
624 708 299 500 1 898
1 000 65.5805
1 000 62 3030
1 000 08 6370
1 000 81 4697
Table 8. R obustness to in roducii g variable desired inarki ps. Specification (ii)
Pre-1984 Sample Post- 1984 Sample
4>, a h 7 </>. A D.F. a h 7 e <t>. A D.F.
00 lOU 911 284 231 2 03 7 103 84 1481 152 89 7 094 126 3 937 970 65 25 19
05 100 971 783 3 5 7 3 113 138 86 3120 293 871 340 238 5 000 902 61 6554
10 103 975 861 647 2 872 53 9 85 094 4 54 84 7 507 382 5 000 916 68 2704
15 107 979 0.886 707 3.017 592 87 0394 0,641 651 0.176 0.510 1 485 0,962 814112
20 192 961 890 753 2 672 620 91 3670 78 4 765 64 4 60 1 2 663 1,000 98 64 15
25 16 2 959 858 781 2 177 604 96 9929
30 420 828 871 825 1 137 n 1
1
103 2897
Notes: A star denotes that the estiinate reaches the lower bound impo.scd in estimation.
5 Concluding Remarks
Using an identified VAR over the pre- and post- 1984 periods BG provided evidence of
a significant reduction in the effects of oil price shocks on both prices and quantities in
the latter period. In this paper we have looked at the effects of oil prices to learn about
changes occurred in the structure of the economy. We have presented a New Keynesian
model and used a minimum distance estimator that miniinizes the distance between the
empirical IRFs obtained by BG and those implied by the model. This estimation points
to relevant structural changes which have modified the mechanism through which oil price
shocks propagate in the economy.
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Two sets of parameters work nearly equally well across the two different specifications
for the process of expectations' formation which we have considered. While this is not a
case of weak identification, as the two sets of parameters do not work equally well for a
given model, small variations in specification lead to large differences in the relative role of
two major structural changes. If inflation expectations are assumed to be partly based on
the current level of inflation, the structural change behind the differences across the two
periods is a dramatic decline in real wage rigidities, with a smaller role for better monetary
policy. A story of more flexible labor market, weakening unions and vanishing wage
indexation thus emerges as the major explanation. Conversely, if inflation expectations are
assumed to be partly based on the lagged level of inflation, the major explanation behind
the changes is a more effective anchoring of inflation expectations, which we interpret as
an improvement in monetary policy credibility, with a smaller role left for lower wage
rigidities. The conclusions associated with each formalization are reasonably robust to an
alternative VAR specification and to a number of modifications of the model.
Our paper thus sheds light on the pros and cons of impulse response matching as a
strategy of estimating model parameters. On the one hand, the advantage of identifying
the parameters of the model from the IRFs to oil shock is that the shock to oil is observable
and can be directly identified in the data. On the other hand, the particular shock only
sheds light on some of the parameters and the fitting of only one set of IRFs does not help
to disentangle between the role played by vanishing wage indexation and the role played
by the improvement in the credibility of monetary policy.
This suggests a more general strategy. In order to discriminate between the relative
roles of these two structural changes, one should extend the minimum distance estimation
to fit not only the IRFs to oil shocks, but also the IRFs to other clearly identified shocks
for which the two structural changes make a substantial difference. If shocks to monetary
policy were easy to identify, they would provide a natural candidate: higher real wage
flexibility leads to an increase in the response of jarices to monetary policy; better an-
choring of expectations leads to a decrease in the response of prices to monetary policy.
The challenge, as is well known, is that these shocks are not easy to identify. A question
is whether other, more easily identifled, shocks, can serve the same purpose. We leave
further exploration along these lines to future research.
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Appendix A
We assume a continuum of infinitely-lived households, indexed by j. They seek to
maximize:
oo
EoY,P'{U{C,{j),C,^,)~V{N,{j))} (28)
t=o
where Ct = \~'^ (1 — x)~ " ^m,t^q~t^ '^^'^'^ where Cm,t denotes consumption of (im-
ported) oil, Cqj is a CES index of domestic goods, Nt denotes employment or hours
worked, x is the equilibrium share of oil in consumption. We assume that households are
concerned with "catching up with the Joneses": there is a certain degree of external habit
persistence, indexed by the parameter h G [0, 1); Ct-i is the aggregate consumption level
in period t-1
U{a{j),Q.,)^ ^^'^'^-^'^'~'^"^ (29)
1 — (T
V{N,ij))^^-^ (30)
1-1-0
The period budget constraint is given by:
P,,C,,t (j) + P,n,tC„., U) + QfB, U) ^ B,_i (j) + WtNtij) + n, (31)
1
where P^^t =
( /g Pq.i (0
~' dij ' is a price index for domestic goods, P,nj is the price
of oil (in domestic currency), Wt is the nominal wage and IIj are profits. Qf is the price
of a one-period nominally riskless domestic bond, paying one unit of domestic currency.
Bt denotes the quantity of that bond purchased in period t. The optimal allocation of
expenditures between imported and domestically produced good implies:
Pq,tC,, = {I - \) PctCt (32)
Pm,t^m,t — \Pc,t\^t (33)
_ qP i« t'^'^ C
the household problem are:
{C\ - hC,^,r = P^A nB^p (C^'+i - ^'C-.)-" j (34)
^ = Nt [Ct - hCt-xY (35)
Loglinearizing equation 34 yields equation 4. Loglinearizing equation 35 and assuming
a slow adjustment of wages to labor market conditions yields equation 5.
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where Pc^t = PmtPq,t ^ s the PI index. The first order conditions associated with
Appendix B: Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve with variable desired
markups
A finn reoptimizing in period t will choose the price P*; solving the following problem:
max J^e'Et {At,t+k [P^tQi+k/t - *t+fc (Qt+k/t)] }
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
Qt+k/t —
P.
q,i
where A^+fc = /?' [^%^Sf^
Pq,t+k
P,
^t+k
p
'''
1 is the stochastic discount factor; ^( (•) is
the cost function; Qt+kit is the level of output in period / + A; for a firm whose price was
last set in period i; e^+t is a stochastic parameter which determines the variable desired
markup in the goods market. . .
We obtain the first order condition: ,
Y.S'^EtAt^i+k [l-^t+k)
fc=0
or equivalently:
'^t+k
p-^t+ k
q,t+k
hfc (p* \ ~^t+ k C
q,t+k
= (36)
7 , (^ EtAt^t+kQt+ k/t [{£t+ k — 1) Pq,t ~ £t+k^'ICt+k/tPq,t+ k\ ~ (37)
fc=0
where ip^^f^j^ = %^^ {Qt+k/t) and MCt+k+ /t p'"^''^' are respectively the nominal and
the real marginal cost in period t + k for a firm that last reset its price in period t.
Log-linearizing around a zero inflation steady state yields:
Kt = (1 J2d'/3'
k=0
Pq,t + k
^t+ k
e-1 + mct+k/t
Taking into account the aggregate price index:
p^r - ^plt-'i + (1 - ^) {p;,t)
l-Et
(38)
(39)
we get the following domestic inflation, where the variable desired markup operates
as a cost push shock:
'(?,( — /9 Et{T^q.t+i} - -^p ( /i/ H ZT^' (40)
Assuming that 'st ,Sj yields equation 27.
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Figure 1. Impulse responses to an oil price shock
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Figure 2. Domestic Inflation Expectations response to an oil price shock
—>— X ^ 1
—*
— A = 0.4 Model Specification i
—•
— A — 0.4 Model Specification ii
The remaining parameters are calibrated as follows: /3=0.99, Q'„ = 0.985, Q',„ = 0.015,
X = 0.023, = 1, (J = 0.3, e = 6, /i = 0.9, 7 = 0.9, 9 - 0.7, cf)^ - 2.5.
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Figure 3a. Estimated and Implied IRFs. Specification (i)
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Figure 3b. Estimated and Implied IFlFs. Specification (ii)
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Figure 4. Impulse responses to an oil price shock. Level/Growth
specification of the VAR
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Figure 5a. Estimated and Implied IRFs. Level/growth VAR. Model
specification (i)
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Figure 5b. Estimated and Implied IRFs. Level/growth VAR. Model
specification (ii)
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Figure 6a. Estimated and Implied IRFs. Leontief technology. Model
specification (i)
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Figure 6b. Estimated and Implied IRFs. Leontief technology. Model
specification (ii)
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